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A primary aim of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) is to expand access to 
health insurance to small businesses and individuals. These groups 
experience significant barriers to obtaining affordable insurance because they 
are subject to discriminatory practices by insurers and lack the necessary 
market power to negotiate reasonable premiums. While much attention has 
been paid to the ACA's requirement for state exchanges through which these 
groups will shop for insurance, and reforms of insurers' practices, less is 
known about the ACA's provision for nonprofit, member-owned health 
insurance cooperatives (or co-ops) that will operate inside these exchanges. 
Cooperatives are limited in scope, but they have the potential to strengthen 
the position and control of small firms and individuals in the health insurance 
decisions. 
In this article, I briefly sketch the insertion of cooperative provision in 
the ACA, and note how this represented a compromise between progressive 
and conservative Democrats in Congress. I then use Common Ground 
Healthcare Cooperative (CGHC) as a case study to explore the political and 
technical challenges facing the creation and implementation of cooperatives at 
state level. Located in Wisconsin, CGHC is one of the first wave of co-ops to 
receive federal funding under the ACA. I conclude with an assessment of the 
possible impact that co-ops may have on the US health care system. 
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Problems of Affordability in the Small Group 
and Individual Insurance Markets 
 
Small firms and individuals face specific obstacles to finding 
affordable health insurance that large employers do not. First, small 
employers and individuals are subject to medical underwriting 
practices that place insurance out of reach. These include the use of 
experience rating to calculate premiums according to the expected or 
actual health use of the customer, and exclusion waivers that specify 
certain common health conditions from coverage. Perhaps the most 
insidious practice is the preexisting condition clause, which absolves 
insurers from current coverage of any medical condition that a client 
had ― even if it went untreated or undetected ― in the year prior to 
the start of the insurance policy (Stone 1993). Second and related to 
medical underwriting, the administrative costs are much higher than 
for a single policy that covers a large employer, and the premiums in 
the small group and individual markets reflect such costs (Sered and 
Femandopulle 2007: 114). Lastly, unlike a large firm, small businesses 
and individuals seeking to purchase health insurance are too atomized 
and too small to exert the necessary market power in negotiations 
with a few large insurers. 
Coverage figures attest to the difficulties that small firms and 
individuals face. In 2012, only 35.7% of firms with fewer than 50 
employees offered insurance, while 95.7% of firms with 50 or more 
workers did so (Kaiser Family Foundation 2012a). Between 1999 and 
2012, premiums for employer-based insurance rose from $5,791 to 
$15,745 for family coverage (Employer Health Benefits 2012). 
Whereas large firms must absorb single-digit annual increases in 
premiums, small firms and individuals routinely face double-digit 
annual rate hikes of 30% or more (Jacobs and Skocpol 2010: 111; 
Jagler 2012: 21). 
 
Cooperatives under the ACA 
 
To rectify these problems, the ACA requires that each state 
create a health insurance marketplace, or exchange, through which 
small businesses with fewer than 100 employees and individuals can 
choose among competing insurers. All insurance companies must offer 
minimum levels of coverage and must market their products in easily 
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comparable and understandable formats. The law also provides 
subsidies for persons with incomes up to 400 percent of the federal 
poverty line and tax credits for firms with fewer than 25 full-time 
employees that opt to offer insurance. The ACA also requires insurers 
in the exchanges to use modified community rating instead of 
experience rating. All insurers will have to accept any client regardless 
of health status. The ACA also inserted a provision for the creation of a 
nonprofit insurance cooperative in each exchange 
(www.healthcare.gov; Kaiser Family Foundation 2012b). 
A cooperative is a mutual self-help organization whose members 
join together to enhance their market power. They are member-
governed, and if nonprofit, must invest surpluses into the services and 
operations of the organization (Richardson 2011). Rural health care 
cooperatives sprang up during the New Deal, but most were short-
lived (Jost 2011; Richardson 2011). 
The ACA gave cooperatives a new lease on life and constituted a 
compromise between progressive and conservative Democrats in 
Congress on the terms of health care reform. Many progressives 
advocated a single-payer health insurance system like Canada's, or 
"Medicare for all." But moderates saw it as politically infeasible, as a 
government takeover of health care that would vastly expand federal 
and state budgets obligations. Other reformers proposed a public 
option as a middle way. The public option would have preserved 
existing employment-based insurance while permitting a government 
health plan to compete alongside private insurers in the small group 
and individual exchanges (Hacker 2008). House Democrats inserted a 
watered-down public option in their reform bill, but Senate Democrats 
refused to follow suit. Conservatives within the Democratic caucus in 
the Senate had more leverage than their House counterparts, and the 
rules of debate posed a real possibility that reform bill might not reach 
a vote on the Senate floor. For conservative Senate Democrats and 
private insurers, the public option was still too much government 
(Jacobs and Skocpol 2010: 59-64).2 Senator Kent Conrad (D-ND) 
offered a way forward with his proposal for cooperatives as a 
bipartisan solution (Conrad 2009; Gardner 2009; Weisman 2009). 
Conrad maintained that nonprofit, member-governed co-ops with a 
strong consumer focus could appease advocates of a public option, 
while co-ops run by and for small businesses and operating at state 
level could assuage the fears of those concerned with a government 
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takeover of health care (Weisman 2009). While failing to achieve 
bipartisan agreement, cooperatives became part of the Senate bill and 
the final ACA. 
Section 1322 of the Affordable Care Act created the Consumer 
Operated and Oriented Plan (CO-OP) program, and provides up to $3.8 
billion in federal loans to help cover the start-up costs of nonprofit, 
member-owned and operated health insurance companies in each 
state exchange. According to the law, each cooperative must be 
governed by its members, have a strong consumer focus, and reinvest 
any profits into the organization in order to improve benefits or health 
care delivery, or lower premiums. To ensure that co-ops are truly 
representative of small businesses and individuals, the ACA bars 
existing health insurance companies and state or local governments 
from creating such entities (Kaiser Family Foundation 2012b: 4). 
 
The Common Ground Healthcare Cooperative 
(CGHC) 
 
Common Ground Healthcare Cooperative (CGHC) was among 
the first wave of co-ops to receive federal funding in February 2012. It 
was established by Common Ground, an organization of religious 
congregations, neighborhood associations, and schools working to 
achieve positive social change in southeastern Wisconsin. Common 
Ground, in tum, is an affiliate of the Industrial Areas Foundation (IAF) 
community organizing network. Though established by Common 
Ground, the co-op is a separate legal entity with its own management 
and board of directors (Common Ground; CGHC 2012). 
The creation of CGHC is a story of perseverance and a 
willingness to adjust to new circumstances. The effort began in 2007 
when Common Ground leaders consulted their member organizations 
and learned that affordable health insurance was one of their chief 
concerns. Next, the leadership formed a health care team of Common 
Ground members to research the issue and consider possible solutions. 
In 2008, well before the election of Barack Obama, Common Ground's 
membership decided to create a health insurance purchasing 
cooperative for small businesses, self-employed individuals, and 
nonprofits. During the next three years, the health care team 
conducted informational meetings with over 200 small businesses and 
individuals to gauge their interest in the idea and met with state 
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officials and health care stakeholders to seek their support. The team 
also sought state and federal seed money for the co-op, but the fiscal 
strains associated with the 2008 recession closed off such possibilities. 
The passage of the ACA opened a new door, however. The type 
of co-op under the law was a nonprofit, member-owned insurance 
company to be offered in the state exchanges for small businesses and 
individuals. Accordingly, Common Ground abandoned its plans for an 
insurance purchasing cooperative and instead worked to establish a 
nonprofit health insurance company and seek federal funding under 
the ACA. The CGHC submitted a loan application to the Department of 
Health and Human Services (DHHS) in the fall of2011 and was one of 
seven co-ops to receive development loans from the federal 
government in February 2012. The federal loans of up to $56.4 million 
represent crucial assistance to CGHC to address the start-up costs it 
faces in a mature health insurance market (Boulton 2012b). Following 
the ACA's timetable, CGHC will begin enrolling members in October 
2013, with coverage commencing on January 1, 2014. CGHC will offer 
insurance to small businesses of 50 or fewer employees, nonprofits, 
and individuals in seven southeastern Wisconsin counties (CGHC 2012; 
Jagler 2012: 21). 
 
Challenges to the CGHC 
 
To succeed, co-ops must overcome political and technical 
challenges. The political tasks include garnering federal funding and 
designation, while winning support from policymakers at state level. In 
Wisconsin, the political climate was initially favorable to Common 
Ground's efforts to create a co-op. For most of 2008, the 
administration of Democratic Governor Jim Doyle worked on its own 
plan for an exchange, BadgerChoice, modeled on the Massachusetts 
exchange. But the state's fiscal difficulties the following year required 
Doyle to put the plan on hold (Business Journal 2008; Hess 2009; 
Common Ground n.d.). Following the enactment of the ACA, the 
federal government designated Wisconsin an early leader in developing 
an exchange, and awarded the state $38 million to resume its work. 
The political climate abruptly shifted following the midterm 
elections in 2010. Republicans wrested majority control of the US 
House of Representatives and vowed to block the implementation of 
the ACA. In Wisconsin, Republicans swept both houses of the state 
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legislature and the governorship from the Democrats. The new 
governor, Scott Walker, championed the Tea Party ideology of small 
government and low taxes. Health policy in Wisconsin was also 
subsumed in the ferocious struggle over public employees' collective 
bargaining rights in 2011-12. Walker prevailed in that battle, but the 
matter poisoned the political climate and halted any meaningful 
legislative activity until after the 2012 elections. 
Governor Walker initially gave mixed signals on the direction of 
his administration toward the ACA. In the name of small government 
and state's rights, Wisconsin became one of26 states to file a lawsuit 
challenging the constitutionality of the ACA before the US Supreme 
Court. At the same time, however, Walker directed his administration 
to continue work on the exchange under the aegis of the newly 
created Office of Free Market Health Care (OFMHC 2011). In late 
December 2011, however, the governor reversed course, halting work 
on the exchange pending the Supreme Court ruling (Boulton 2012a), 
and subsequently returning the $38 million in federal money that 
Doyle had received for the exchange. According to Walker, '"Stopping 
the encroachment of ObamaCare in our state, which has the potential 
to have a devastating impact on Wisconsin's economy, is a top 
priority"' (Stein 2012a). While Democratic legislators were more 
receptive to Common Ground's bid for federal funding of the coop, 
Republicans adopted a stance of calculated indifference and Walker 
remained silent on the news that CGHC had secured the federal loan.3 
The political climate has since become more settled in 2012. The 
ACA's survival is assured with the Supreme Court's decision upholding 
most of the ACA's provisions and President Obama's reelection in 
November, and the Walker administration has since clarified its 
position. On November 15, the governor announced that he would let 
the federal government set up the exchange in Wisconsin. He justified 
his decision by citing the potential cost to Wisconsin taxpayers to run a 
state exchange and arguing that the state would have had little power 
in setting its parameters. His stance sat well with the 20 Tea Party 
organizations that had urged this course of action, but less so with the 
state's business community and health care providers who had pushed 
for a state-created exchange (Durhams et al. 2012; Stein and Boulton 
2012). 
Throughout the unsettled political climate, Common Ground 
remained undaunted. The organization continued its work on the co-
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op, and maintained that it could operate with or without an exchange. 
For CGHC, the political saga had a positive outcome for its future 
operations, since the insurance reforms will go forward and Wisconsin 
will get an exchange. 
There are still a number of significant technical challenges that 
CGHC must confront. First, the co-op needs management and 
administrative expertise in order to design benefit packages and 
negotiate contracts with providers. CGHC is well positioned in this 
regard, having hired a senior management team and administrative 
staff with strong backgrounds in the health care industry. Its board of 
directors includes experts in health care management alongside 
consumer representatives. CGHC also got an early start by partnering 
with firms with expertise in actuarial, benefits, and legal matters when 
developing its loan application, and these entities continue to provide 
assistance.4 
Second, co-ops like CGHC face formidable barriers to market 
entry (Gray 2011). They will be up against well-established, large 
national insurers to offer products that are competitive on price and 
quality. In addition, the ACA's prohibition on using federal loan money 
for marketing purposes may place cooperatives at a disadvantage 
relative to established insurers. This requires co-ops to be creative in 
devising ways to get information on its products out to potential 
members. For CGHC, this might include using foundation money for 
marketing purposes and contracting with existing insurance brokers to 
sell its products. The co-op might also find Common Ground member 
organizations, and the small businesses and individuals that the health 
care team has contacted in the past three years, to make up an 
important source of its initial enrollment. 
Adverse selection poses a significant challenge to the co-op's 
survival, though the ACA might diminish this threat somewhat. The 
ACA requires that two-thirds of co-op insurance policies be written for 
the small businesses and individuals, which could mean the enrollment 
of people who had previously been shut out of the insurance market 
because of preexisting medical conditions. If CGHC fails to attract 
enough healthy members to pool risks with sicker enrollees, it could go 
bankrupt.5 However, the ACA contains important provisions to mitigate 
this danger. The individual mandate should bring healthier members 
into the exchange, and presumably the co-op will benefit from this. 
The law's provisions for modified community rating and risk-adjusted 
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payments among insurers in the exchanges should also moderate 
premiums differences among insurance companies and compensate 
the co-op if it enrolls less healthy members. Moreover, the bulk of the 
federal loan money that CGHC received must go into its reserves to 
pay out insurance claims, which could tide the co-op over during its 
perilous formative period. 
The co-op's size will also be critical to its success in negotiating 
contracts with large, established provider systems. One estimate is 
that insurers need 500,000 members to exert such leverage (Pear and 
Harris 2009; Weisman 2009), something that small startups like CGHC 
may not possess. But the ACA prohibits some forms of collaboration 
among co-ops that could undermine their market power relative to 
providers. While coops may form "private councils" with each other to 
purchase and share claims processing and administrative services, the 
ACA bars them from coordinating fee negotiations with providers in 
order to avoid running afoul of antitrust law (Gray 2011: 3 ). This ban 
rules out an "all-payer system" that would have given co-ops the 
ability to negotiate lower uniform fee schedules with providers. 
Still, co-ops like CGHC may be able to collaborate with providers 
to promote affordable quality care. Providers are consolidating into 
integrated delivery systems (IDSs) to survive and bolster their 
marketing position relative to insurers (Devers et al. 2003). At the 
same time, IDSs and their use of electronic medical records are an 
opportunity for co-ops to negotiate new forms of coordinated care and 
reimbursement, such as accountable care organizations and medical 
homes, which could meet both cost and clinical effectiveness. 
But if other insurers offer similar products, what might set co-
ops apart from their rivals? In the end, cooperatives' distinctive rules 
and governance structure could prove critical competitive advantages. 
First, as a nonprofit, a co-op like CGHC must invest any surplus into 
the organization to improve benefits and health care delivery, or to 
lower premiums and expand enrollment. This means that unlike their 
for-profit rivals, co-ops are unencumbered by the need to distribute its 
profits to shareholders as dividends or pay exorbitant salaries to 
CEOs.6 This gives co-ops like CGHC a longer time horizon in which to 
operate, particularly if it can enroll members for three years rather 
than one. The co-op model is one based mutual assistance, trust, and 
shared commitment. Such "social capital" (Putnam 2000) is lacking in 
faceless national insurers. Moreover, because it is member-owned and 
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governed, CGHC can offer clients transparency, accountability, and 
responsiveness that a national commercial insurer cannot. CGHC 
members will have a direct say on its strategic decisions through their 
presence on the board of directors, and will have access to its financial 
records. Since the co-op is "us" and not "them, it should be expected 
to tailor insurance products that meet the needs of small businesses 
and offer personalized service that a distant insurance carrier may not 
be able to provide.7 
Most important, the co-op offers small firms and individuals the 
possibility of exerting genuine market power in the market for health 
insurance and health care for the first time. By banding together as a 
single insurance company, previously powerless individuals and small 
businesses may finally have the clout to negotiate competitive 
contracts with providers directly. There is no assurance that exchanges 
in and of themselves will provide this. To be sure, exchanges will 
structure the competition and set rules so that insurers will have to 
compete fairly and transparently for customers. But if those customers 
remain puny and atomized, insurers might still treat them with 
disdain. But if individuals and small firms become the insurance 
company-and become a large enough one-they will be able to free 
themselves from servitude to insurance middlemen and be a size that 
providers will have to reckon with. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Given their restrictive design under the ACA, co-operatives are 
unlikely to fundamentally transform the US health care system in ways 
that progressive forces had hoped. Nevertheless, co-ops could reshape 
the local or regional markets in which they will operate. If successful, 
they will empower small businesses and individuals and offer them 
democratic, responsive health care experiences. For these groups too 
long disdained by commercial insurers, this would represent 
meaningful, positive change. 
 
Notes: 
1 The author is a member of the Common Ground health care team and 
previously served on the board of directors of CGHC.  
2 A filibuster allows unlimited debate on a bill on the Senate floor, unless at 
least 60 senators move to end debate and take a vote on a bill. 
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Democratic leaders in the Senate did not believe they had the requisite 
supermajority to overcome such a filibuster. 
3 Common Ground failed to secure letters of support from politicians of either 
party to include with its loan application for the co-op. Staffers of 
Democratic Congresswoman Gwen Moore, Senator Herb Kohl, and 
state Senator Jon Richards met with Common Ground and expressed 
their support for the co-op, but Republican Senator Ron Johnson, 
Representatives Paul Ryan and Jim Sensenbrenner, and state Senator 
Leah Vukmir rebuffed requests by Common Ground for meetings in 
2011. 
4 These included Milliman, Benefits Services Group, Quarles and Brady law 
firm, and assistance and advice from the National Association of State 
Health Co-Ops (NASHCO). 
5 According to expert testimony before the Consumer Operated and Oriented 
Health Plans advisory board and from a consultant who assisted 
Senate staff in drafting the ACA, an insurer needs 25,000 members or 
5% of the market to effectively counter adverse selection (Gray 20 II: 
6, 8, n. I 7; Pear and Harris 2009; Weisman 2009). 
6 Most for-profit insurers spend only 80% or 85% of premiums on direct 
medical care, with the rest going to administrative costs, marketing, 
and salaries (Reid 2009, 20 I 0: 37). Bob Connolly, CGHC's president, 
admits that the CEO will be paid a competitive salary, but says it will 
be below the $50 million remuneration typical ofCEOs offor-profit 
insurers (Jagler, 2012: 21). 
7 CGHC CEO Cathy Mahaffey notes that most small employers do not have the 
resources to create their own health promotion and prevention 
programs for their workers, but that the co-op could involve its 
members in decisions on benefits designs that meet their particular 
needs (Jagler 2012: 22). 
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